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Abstract
We study the implementability of stable correspondences in mar-
riage markets with externalities. We prove that, contrary to what
happens in markets without externalities, no stable revelation mecha-
nism makes a dominant strategy for the agents on one side of the mar-
ket to reveal their preferences. However, the stable correspondence is
implementable in Nash equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we study the implementation of stable correspondences in one-
to-one matching markets, or marriage markets, with externalities. In those
markets agents care not only about their partner but also about the partners
of the other agents. Relevant examples include labor markets in which work-
ers care about their colleagues, school choice problems in which families care
about their children's classmates and partner dance competitions in which
each couple care about how the other couples are formed.
A focal concept in matching theory is stability. A stable matching is de-
ﬁned by two requirements. The ﬁrst one is individual rationality: no agent
prefers to stay unmatched rather than accepting her/his assigned partner.
The second condition is that the matching must not be blocked by a pair.
That is, no pair of agents would both prefer to be matched together rather
than to accept their allocation. Stability plays a central role in the success
of centralized mechanisms (see, Abdulkadiro§lu and Sönmez, 2013 and Roth
and Sotomayor, 1990). Deﬁning stability in markets with externalities is not
straightforward. Indeed, it has to take into account the expectations of a
potential deviating agent or pair about the behavior of the other agents (see
Bando and Muto, 2016). We consider a concept of stability based on prudent
expectations. We assume that a pair blocks matching µ only if both agents
strictly prefer any matching in which they are together to matching µ. This
concept of stability, introduced by Sasaki and Toda (1996), guarantees the
existence of stable matchings in marriage markets with externalities.
We start studying direct mechanisms and uncover a diﬀerence with respect to
markets without externalities. In those markets the woman-optimal (resp.
man-optimal) stable mechanism makes a dominant strategy for all women
(resp. men) reveal their preferences (see Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). In-
stead, when there are externalities, there exists no stable revelation mech-
anism which makes truth-telling a dominant strategy for all women (resp.
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men). In particular, no stable revelation mechanism makes truth-telling a
dominant strategy for all agents.
We then consider Nash equilibria (NE, from now on) of preference revelation
games and prove that, under a mild restriction, any stable revelation mecha-
nism implements the set of individually rational matchings in NE, extending
the ﬁndings by Alcalde (1996) (see also Shin and Suh, 1996).
Finally, we consider general mechanisms and investigate the implementa-
tion of stable correspondences in NE (see Maskin, 1999). Kara and Sönmez
(1996) prove that, in a model without externalities, the stable correspon-
dence is implementable in NE. We follow their same strategy and employ
the characterization of Nash implementable allocations by Yamato (1992) to
prove that the stable correspondence is implementable in NE if there are
externalities.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model.
Section 3 considers implementation through stable revelation mechanism the
results. Section 4 considers implementation in NE through general mecha-
nisms. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
There are two disjoint sets of women and men, W and M , respectively. Set
N = W ∪M . A matching is a function µ : W ∪M → W ∪M such that
(i) µ(w) ∈ M ∪ {w} for all w ∈ W , µ(m) ∈ W ∪ {m} for all m ∈ M and
(ii) µ2(i) = i for all i ∈ N .1 We denote a matching µ by a set of pairs
and single agents. By µ = {(w1,m1) , (w2,m2) , ..., (wr, wr) , i1, i2, .., ik}, we
denote matching µ in which µ (wl) = ml and µ (il) = il for all l. Let A
be the set of matchings. For each (w,m) ∈ W × M , let (w,m) = {µ ∈
A : µ(w) = m}. Similarly, for each i ∈ N let A(i) = {µ ∈ A : µ(i) = i}.
Agent i has strict, complete and transitive preferences over A, denoted by
1Function µ2 is deﬁned by µ2 (i) = µ (µ (i)).
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Pi. Let Ri be the weak preference relation associated to Pi, which is µRiµ
′
if either µPiµ
′ or µ = µ′ for every µ, µ′ ∈ A. By P we denote the set of
strict preferences over A. A marriage market with externalities is a triple
(W,M,P ), where P ∈ P |N |.2 We represent the preferences of agent i ∈ N by
a list of matchings. For example, Pi : µ1, µ2, ..., µk, ... means that µjPiµk for
each j < k.
We employ the concept of stability introduced by Sasaki and Toda (1996).
A matching µ is individually rational if there is no i ∈ N such that µ′Piµ for
all µ′ ∈ A(i). A pair (w,m) ∈ W ×M blocks µ if µ′Pwµ and µ′Pmµ for all
µ′ ∈ A(w,m). The matching µ is stable if it is individually rational and no
pair blocks it. Let S(P ) be the set of stable matchings under P . We have
S(P ) 6= ∅ for all P ∈ P |N |.3
Let D ⊆ P |N |. A social choice correspondence Γ : D ⇒ A maps proﬁles of
preferences into subsets of matchings. The stable correspondence is deﬁned
by Γ(P ) = S(P ) for all P ∈ P |N |. A mechanism is a pair (S, g) where
S =
∏
i∈N Si, Si is the strategy space of agent i ∈ N and g : S → A is
the outcome function. In a revelation mechanism, S ⊆ P |N |. In a stable
revelation mechanisms g (P ) ⊆ S(P ) for all P ∈ D. Each mechanism (S, g)
induces a strategic form game, (W,M,P, S, g). Let NE(P, S, g) denote the
set of pure strategy Nash equilibria of game (W,M,P, S, g). Mechanism (S, g)
implements Γ if g(NE(P, S, g)) = Γ(P ) for all P ∈ D.
3 Revelation mechanisms
We start by considering dominant strategies. Without externalities, the
woman-optimal stable mechanism makes truth-telling a dominant strategy
for each woman. On the contrary, in markets with externalities, no stable
revelation mechanism makes truth-telling a dominant strategy for the agents
2For every set X, |X| denotes the cardinality of set X.
3See Theorem 4.1 in Sasaki and Toda (1996).
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on one side of the market.
Proposition 1 Let D = P |N |. There is no stable revelation mechanism in
which reporting the true preferences is a dominant strategy for women.
Proof. The proof is by mean of an example. Let W = {w1, w2} and let
M = {m1,m2}. There are seven matchings: µ1 = {(w1,m1) , (w2,m2)}, µ2 =
{(w1,m1) , w2,m2}, µ3 = {(w2,m1) , (w1,m2)}, µ4 = {(w2,m1) , w1,m2},
µ5 = {(w1,m2) , w2,m1}, µ6 = {(w2,m2) , w1,m1} and µ7 = {w1, w2,m1,m2}.
Consider their following preferences:
Pw1 : µ1, µ4, µ6, µ5, µ2, µ3, µ7; Pw2 : µ5, µ2, µ1, µ3, µ4, µ6, µ7;
Pm1 : µ1, µ5, µ6, µ4, µ7, µ2, µ3; Pm2 : µ4, µ1, µ2, µ3, µ5, µ6, µ7.
We have S(P ) = {µ1, µ4, µ5, µ6}.4 Let ϕ be a stable revelation mechanism,
then ϕ(P ) ∈ S(P ). Consider the following cases.
(i) ϕ(P ) = µ5. Let P
′
w1
: µ1, µ4, µ6, µ7, .... Let P
′ = (P ′w1 , P−w1), we have
S(P ′) = {µ1, µ4, µ6}.5 Since µ′ Pw1 µ5 for all µ′ ∈ S(P ′), woman w1 has
incentives to misrepresent her preferences.
(ii) Let P ′′w2 = µ2, µ5, µ7, .... Let P
′′ = (P ′′w2 , P−w2), we have S(P
′′) = {µ5}.6
Since µ5 Pw2 µ
′ for all µ′ ∈ {µ1, µ4, µ6}, woman w2 has incentives to
misrepresent her preferences.
The argument is easily generalized to any W and M .7 Then, there is no
stable revelation mechanism in which truth-telling is a dominant strategy for
women.
4Matchings µ2 and µ3 are not individually rational for m1, µ7 is blocked by {w1,m2}
and {w2,m2}.
5Matchings µ2, µ3, µ5 are not individually rational for w1, µ7 is blocked by {w2,m2}.
6Matchings µ1, µ3, µ4, µ6 are not individually rational for w2, µ2 is not individually
rational form1, µ7 is blocked by {w1,m2}.
7The proof is available upon request.
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Consider the domain of preferences where each agent ranks consecutively all
matchings where she/he is unmatched. Formally, let
P˜ = {P ∈ P |N | : ∀ i ∈ N , @ µ′,µ′′∈ A (i), µ /∈ A (i), µ′PiµPiµ′′} .
We next characterize the incentive properties of stable revelation mecha-
nisms.
Proposition 2 Let ϕ be a stable revelation mechanism in the marriage mar-
ket with externalities. If D ⊆ P |N |, all NE outcomes are individually ratio-
nal. In addition, if D = P˜, ϕ implements the individually rational corre-
spondence in NE.
Proof. We ﬁrst prove that any NE outcome is individually rational for all
agents. By the deﬁnition of a stable matching, ϕ (P ) is individually rational
for all P ∈ P |N |. In particular, if ϕ(P ′) is not individually rational for agent i
in market (W,M,P ), then agent i has a proﬁtable deviation: to state her/his
true preference Pi, then P
′ is not a NE.
Assume D = P˜ . Let µ be an individually rational matching in market
(W,M,P ). We will prove that µ is a NE outcome. For all i ∈ N , consider
preference P ′i such that (i) µ
′P ′iµ
′′, ∀µ′ ∈ A(i), ∀µ′′ ∈ A(i, j) with j /∈
{i, µ(i)}; (ii) if µ(i) 6= i then µ′′P ′iµ′ ∀µ′ ∈ A(i), ∀µ′′ ∈ A(i, µ(i)) . Let
P ′ = (P ′i )i∈N . Then {µ} = S (P ′) and P ′ is a NE.
4 General mechanisms
Now we study the implementation of the stable correspondence S in NE.
We ﬁrst introduce additional notation. Let L(µ,Ri) = {µ′ ∈ A : µRiµ′} be
the lower contour set of µ ∈ A at Ri. A preference proﬁle P ′ is a monotonic
transformation of P at µ ∈ A if L(µ,Ri) ⊆ L(µ,R′i) for all i ∈ N . A social
choice correspondence Γ is monotonic if, for all P, P ′ ∈ D and all µ ∈ A
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such that µ ∈ Γ(P ) and P ′ is a monotonic transformation of P at µ, then
µ ∈ Γ(P ′). Let i ∈ N and X ⊆ A. A matching µ ∈ X is essential for agent
i ∈ N in the set X for Γ if µ ∈ Γ(P ) for some preference proﬁle P such that
L(µ,Ri) ⊆ X. The set of essential matchings is denoted by Ess(Γ, i, X).
Correspondence Γ is essentially monotonic if for all P, P ′ ∈ D, for all µ ∈
Γ(P ), if Ess(Γ, i, L(µ,Ri)) ⊆ L(µ,R′i) for all i ∈ N , then µ ∈ Γ(P ′).
The domain P |N | satisﬁes Condition D in Yamato (1992).8 Then, Γ : P |N | ⇒
A is implementable in NE if and only if Γ is essentially monotonic, from
Yamato (1992, Corollary, p. 490).9 Then, we prove that S is implementable
in NE, by proving that S is essentially monotonic (see Kara and Sönmez,
1996). We start proving that the stable correspondence is monotonic.
Lemma 1 The stable correspondence S is monotonic.
Proof. Let P ∈ P |N | and assume µ ∈ S(P ). Let P ′ be a monotonic trans-
formation of P at µ. We prove by contradiction that µ ∈ S(P ′). Assume µ
is not stable under P ′. There exists an agent or a couple which blocks the
matching µ under P ′. Since P ′ is a monotonic transformation of P at µ, for
each i ∈ N , µ′P ′iµ implies µ′P iµ. Then, µ is blocked in market (W,M,P ),
which yields a contradiction.
Correspondence S does not satisfy the no veto-power condition (see Maskin,
1999) so Lemma 1 does not imply the Nash implementability of S, but it is
an important tool in the proof of our main result. Before concluding, we
prove an additional result.
Lemma 2 For all P ∈ P |N |, µ ∈ S(P ) and i ∈ N :
Ess(S, i, L(µ,Ri)) = L(µ,Ri).
8A domain D ⊆ P |N | satisﬁes condition D if, for all µ ∈ A, P ∈ D, i ∈ N and
µ′ ∈ L(µ,Ri), there exists P ′ ∈ D such that L(µ,Ri) = L(µ′, R′i) and for all j 6= i,
L(µ′, R′j) = A.
9See also Danilov (1992).
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Proof. Let i ∈ N , P ∈ P |N |, µ ∈ S(P ). The proof of is in two steps.
1. We prove Ess(S, i, L(µ,Ri)) ⊆ L(µ,Ri).Assume µ′ ∈ Ess(S, i, L(µ,Ri)).
By deﬁnition of Ess(S, i, L(µ,Ri)), there exists a preference proﬁle
P ′ ∈ P |N | such that L(µ′, R′i) ⊆ L(µ,Ri). In particular, µ′ ∈ L(µ,Ri).
2. We prove L(µ,Ri) ⊆ Ess(S, i, L(µ,Ri)). Let µ′ ∈ L(µ,Ri). Notice
that there exists µ∗ ∈ L(µ,Ri) such that µ∗(i) = i, otherwise µ would
not be individually rational for i. Consider the strategy proﬁle P ′ such
that (i) µ′P ′jµ
′′ for all µ′′ 6= A \ {µ′} and all j 6= i; (ii) µ′′P ′iµ′P ′iµ∗
for all µ′′ ∈ A \ {µ′, µ∗}. By (ii) µ∗ ∈ L(µ′, R′i) ⊆ L(µ,Ri). By (i) µ′
is individually rational for all agents j 6= i and no pair (w,m) blocks
µ′ under P ′. By (ii), µ′ is individually rational for i under P ′. Then
µ′ ∈ S(P ′). Then, µ′ ∈ Ess(S, i, L(µ,Ri)).
Applying Lemmas 1 and 2, we prove the main result of the paper.
Theorem 1 The stable correspondence S is implementable in NE.
Proof. The monotonicity of S (Lemma 1) implies that it is essentially
monotonic by Lemma 2. Then, the result follows from Yamato (1992).
5 Concluding Remarks
We have studied incentive problems in marriage markets with externalities
and proved the implementability of the stable correspondence in NE. Future
research should establish the possibility of implementing stable matchings
through simple mechanisms.
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